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THE OPERATIONAL STORY, of 2/15 Fd. Regt. 8 Div. AIF IN THE MALAYAN CAMPAIGN, DECEMBER 5,1941 to FEBRUARY
18,1942 by Lt‑Col. J. W. Wright
D.F.C., E.M. Dec. 5, 1941. The Regiment was stationed at TAMPIN, a medium sized town in the State of
NEGRI SEMBILAN, and situated approximately 180 miles North of SINGAPORE on the
main road and main railway line between SINGAPORE and BANGKOK. Here, training had been carried out for the past three
months in all types of jungle operations appertaining to a Fd Arty Regt
equipped with 3 inch mortars, the weapons which had been brought from Australia
by the Regt On Nov. 23, 1941 new British‑made 25 pdr guns commenced to arrive at TAMPIN for the
Regt and by Nov 29 the full establishment of 24 guns had been received. Much of
the associated gun stores were short however, and these missing items of
essential equipment dribbled in over the next four or five weeks. 25‑pdr
ammunition was on hand, but the Regt lacked a number of ammunition trailers and
many motor vehicles. This meant that when "the balloon went up‑ the
Regt had to take the field with the 3 inch mortars, leaving the 25‑pdr
equipment behind at TAMPIN. During the day of Nov. 29, 1941 a
code signal "AWAKE" was received from HQ, RAA, 8 Div, AIF. This was a
prearranged signal which informed us that the International situation was
deteriorating rapidly and all units of the three services throughout MALAYA and
adjacent territories had to take steps to place themselves in a position of
readiness to assume their operational roles at short notice. For the Regt. this
required being ready to move to various positions in the State of JOHORE at six
hours notice. All personnel were recalled from extended leave. Some had to be
brought back from CAMERON HIGHLANDS and others from the races at K0ALA LUMPUR.
Local leave at TAMPIN was not curtailed at this stage, but later that night a
further code signal was received, "ARMOUR", which meant that war with
JAPAN was imminent. This necessitated immediate internal security measures to
prevent sabotage within the camp area by Fifth Column elements. All leave
whatsoever was cancelled and troops moving outside the camp area had to march
in armed bodies, with officers in pairs. The camp itself was turned into a
defensive perimeter and all guards and sentries were doubled and many extra
posts established. There was a humorous sideof things at this stage, when some
of the ‑trigger happy" boys on sentry duty at night opened fire on
monkeys and stray dogs and alarmed the whole camp, but as no one was shot and no damage caused, everyone had a good laugh
which was a good thing and somewhat relieved the tension. The afternoon of Dec. 5,
1941 brought a further code signal, 'SEAVIEW".
This meant a declaration of war by JAPAN
was hourly expected, and the Regt was to complete preparations so as to be
able to move to allotted stations at half an hour's notice. At 1700 hours on Dec. 6,
1941, the code signal 'RAFFLES" was received.
This was the word to "go". It was followed almost immediately by
detailed orders from RAA 8 Div which moved B Tp under Capt M.A. Lindgren on the
road to the SEDILI Boom and A Tp under Capt F.R. Anderson, to MAWAI, both
places approximately 150 miles away in South East JOHORE. The remaining 4 Tps,
G Sect Sigs, 84 LAD and RHQ moved out at midnight and took the road South to
KLUANG. A small camp guard of about 50 OR's in charge of Lt F.S.G. Hollway was
left behind in TAMPIN. It was a dark night with a sleety driving rain, and as
"blackout" conditions had to be observed it speaks well for the
training and driving discipline of the Regtl drivers that the hundred odd motor
vehicles in a column several miles long arrived at daylight at a
"harbourage" in the MENGKIBOL Estate near KLUANG with only one
vehicle casualty, a truck which ran off the road when the driver momentarily
fell asleep. No damage was done and LAD pulled him out of the ditch to rejoin
the Regt a few hours later. Shortly after reporting arrival at KLUANG orders were received to deploy
as follows: C Tp for KLUANG Aerodrome defence. D Tp for KAHANG Aerodrome defence. E and F Tps in reserve in harbourage near KLUANG Adv RHQ to 27 Bde Adv HQ near JEMALGANG. Rear RHQ and B Ech to remain in the MENGKIBOL Estate harbourage. Heavy and continuous rain had fallen in the last 24 hours and conditions
in the MENGKIBOL Estate harbourage, as in other harbourages were far from
ideal. Roads and tracks were ankle deep with the sticky mud that was
characteristic of the district. The greatest difficulty was experienced in
getting the vehicles off the main road and dispersed amongst the rubber trees
where they would be afforded concealment from air observation. Once in, it was
almost impossible to get them out again until the ground dried. The 2 i/c, Maj
J.S. Workman quickly got road making operations under way, and in a few days
metalled roads led out to the main bitumen road from all sub‑unit areas
in the Regtl harbourage. To this day it remains a mystery where the 2 i/c
managed to "scrounge" all the road metal that he obtained for this
work Dec. 8, 1941 brought us the news that JAPAN without making a formal declaration of
war had made air raids and bombed PEARL HARBOUR and SINGAPORE. A few days later, F Tp under Capt C.G. Filmer was sent to BUKIT LANGKAP,
a Japanese owned iron ore concession on the SEMBRONG River about 12 miles up
from the mouth. During the next two weeks the Regt settled down in the various positions
and proceeded to make themselves as comfortable as only Australians can do
whenever they stop long enought in one spot to have more than a couple of
meals. At this point one must mention what a boon the Colernan Spirit Stoves
were. These, some 40 odd, were a gift to the Regt from the Regimental Comforts
Fund and they proved invaluable under the conditions existing in Malaya. Each
vehicle group in the Regt possessed at least one and it enabled rations to be
broken down to small lots and hot meals prepared for small groups of men in
isolated localities. Between Dec. 11 and 22, 1941
the 3 inch mortars were changed over Tp by Tp and at
last the Regt became fully equipped with 25‑pdrs to everyone's great
delight The mortars were returned to BOD at JOHORE BAHRU Adv RHQ at JEMALUANG closed down on Dec 22 and reopened at the MENGKIBOL
Estate, KLUANG. The following day the RMO, Capt C.R.B. Richards, undertook a highly
important mission. He was despatched with a roll of Straits Settlement dollar
notes to SINGAPORE to purchase extra Christmas fare for the Regt and the
success of his mission may be judged by the fact that on Christmas Day each man
in the Regt received, in addition to the ordinary rations, a portion of
poultry, a bottle of beer or soft drink, a helping of plum pudding, nuts,
raisins, etc. For this handout once again we have to thank the ladies of the
Regimental Comforts Fund. Their devoted and untiring efforts on behalf of the
Regt resulted in large remittances in cash at regular intervals. On Dec. 23, 1941 F Tp was withdrawn from BUKIT LANGKAP and returned to harbourage at the
MENGKIBOL Estate. CHRISTMAS DAY, 1941, the Regt's first away from Australia, passed quietly in the various
positions and justice was done to the good fare provided, and, as cheerful a
time as possible was had by everyone in spite of the weather, mosquitoes and
absence of loved ones. B Tp was recalled from SEDILL Boom on Dec 27, 1941 and joined up with
the rest of the Regt in MENGKIBOL Estate. The new 25‑pdrs required to be calibrated as quickly as possible.
After some search it was decided to do this from one of the Tp positions
occupied by our sister Regt, the 2/10th near MERSING. This
necessitated a 60 mile trip to the 22 Bde area on the East coast. One Tp at a time was relieved from its
operational role, made the trip, shot the calibration series and returned
immediately and resumed its operational role. Then the next Tp, and so on until
all had completed the shoot. Much assistance was received from the 2/10 Fd Regt
in preparation in positions, survey, etc., and without this assistance and
cooperation it would not have been possible to have completed the calibration
shoot so expeditiously. The targets fired on were two "Pagars" Malay
fish traps) situated some distance out from the shore. Dec 28 and 29 were
occupied this way. Dec. 29, 1941 was a day that was highlighted by another important
event. The Regt came under fire for the first time. F Tp relieving A Tp while
the latter were away calibrating their guns at MERSING was occupying the KLUANG
Aerodrome positions when about midday the aerodrome was raided and bombed by
about 15 twin‑engined Jap bombers. One gun position had a near miss from
a 500 kilo bomb and there was one casualty, a bomb shock case, who achieved the
distinction of being the Regt s first operational casualty. About 40/50 bombs
fell on or in the vicinity of the Aerodrome in this raid. For some time past the Regt had been preparing on paper for a change
over from a 2 Bty to a 3 Bty Regt This was brought into existence on Dec. 30, 1941. The new 13ty, 65, took E
and F Tps and Capt W.W. Julius, promoted to Maj, was appointed the OC. Some
changing around and adjustment of personnel was necessary in order to man the
new BHQ. The Regtl set‑up was now as follows: 29 Bby A and B Tps OC Maj K.D. Moulton 30 Bty C and D Tps OC Maj A.F. Ball 65 Bty E and F Tps OC Maj W.W. Jullus. Jan. 5, 1942, about an hour before dawn brought another raid on KLUANG Aerodrome by
Jap bombers. There were no Regtl casualties. Promotions of Officers about this time were as under:‑ To be Majors ‑ Capts K.C. Moulton, W.W. Jullus and L.H. Hellyer. To be Captains ‑ Lts D.J. Makepeace, R.E. Steele and R.P.A.
Rabett. The ranks of the Regt, which were somewhat below strength owing to the
ravages of malaria and other tropical illnesses were brought almost up to
establishment on Jan 7, 1942 by a
draft of reinforcements under Lt R. McLeod. About this time also, Lt F.S.G.
Hollway and rear party left behind at TAMPIN rejoined the Regt. Jan. 9, 1942. Deficiencies in vehicles
and other equipmerit were filled up and all preparations made for a move North.
Warnings to this effect received. Later that day the order was received to move
North with the 8 Div AIF an hour before daylight on the next day. AIF was to
advance and meet the oncoming Japs at the border of JOHORE in accordance with
the role allotted to it by Malayan Command i.e. the defence of the State of
JOHORE. 65 Bty under Maj W.W. Julius, was detached to proceed to the MUAR area
on the West coast of JOHORE, and passing from Regtl Cmd came under the cmd of
44 Indian Bde. (Brig. Duncan). 29 and 30 13tys, G Sect Sigs, 84 LAD with RHQ moved North to a
harbourage in vicinity of 110 mile peg, and came under command of 27 Bde AIF
(Brig M. Duncan Maxwell). Here further orders were received placing 29 Bty in
support of 26 Bn AIF in GEMENCHEH area, and 30 Bty with 30 Bn AIF in BATU ANNAM
area. Adv RHQ was located with 27
Bde Adv HQ about 1 mile North of SEGAMAT. All this day and throughout the night
and the next day the one and only road was jammed with a mass of vehicles on
their withdrawal to the South, the retreating 111 Indian Corps, consisting of
the 9 and 11 Indian Divs. These formations had borne the full force of the Jap
attack since the landing at KOTA BAHRU on Dec 7 and 8 and had been severely
mauled. Tired and worn out with over 5 weeks of continuous rearguard actions,
with practically no air support, and having to contend with sabotage and Fifth
Column activities in their rear all the time, these heroic British and Indian
Regts passed through the 8 Div with a sigh of relief and took up their
positions in the rear of the AIF, Fortunately, for about 3 days this road
movement was masked by heavy rain and low clouds, otherwise the Jap Dive
Bombers would have taken a severe toll of this mass withdrawal. The 8 Div was
lucky also in being able to move up to their new positions without being
troubled from the air. On Jan. 12, 1942, 30 Bty in conformity with move by 30 Bn AIF took up new positions North West
of GEMAS, and the trap was set for the ambush at the GEMENCHEH Bridge. This was
blown up on Jan 14, 1942 and
approximately 600 Japs were killed in the road cutting by the ambushing company
of the 30 Bn. The Japs repaired the bridge in 8 hours and passed tanks across.
The ambush company together with forward observation personnel of 30 Bty under
Capt D.J. Makepeace were cut off from the main position and with great
difficulty made their way back through the jungle to GEMAS three days later.
Capt Makepeace received a bullet wound in the face during the ambush melee.
When the bridge was blown, Maj Ball moved D Tp to a rear position East of
GEMAS, but C Tp guns remained in their positions to support 30 Bn in repulsing
a heavy attack by a Jap Bn supported by about 12 tanks. 3 or 4 tanks were
knocked out by C Tp guns and some 150 to 200 further casualties inflicted on
the Jap infantry. Later that day the Japs massed for another attack with fresh
troops in greater numbers and more tanks. An encircling movement also PAGE 144 MISSING Bty here, particularly A Tp in the middle of a rubber factory area.
Although the Jap Air Arm was extremely active and having no opposition in the
air, was able to carry out uninterrupted reconnaisances from as low as a few
hundred feet both Btys were firing constantly for two days in these positions
and were not once "spotted". Naturally, everyone lay under cover as
quiet as mice while the aircraft were overhead, but as soon as they had
departed from the immediate vicinity of the positions, off came the nets and
camouflage and the guns continued with their tasks. Both Btys on a heavy fire
plan of harassing tasks all night and most of the day. Targets were the road
passing through SEGAMAT and areas along the SEGAMAT River bank. Over 2000
rounds fired in the 24 hours. F00s and front line elements testified to the
accuracy of the gunfire in these engagements. Same positions were occupied on Jan 20, 1942 after another heavy night
of counter preparation and harassing fire tasks by both 29 and 30 Btys. On the night of Jan 20121 the extremely critical situation in the MUAR
River operations forced a retirement to PALOH Road, a few miles South East of
YONG PENG. For some hours it looked as if the Japs might succeed in cutting off
our main road force by advancing and securing the road junction before our
troops were clear, but a delaying action by a holding force a few miles down
the MUAR Road managed to hold them up until all our troops had passed the road
junction. About this time we learned that our MUAR RIVER FORCE had been
overwhelmed and the Japs were in possession of practically the whole of the
West coast of Malaya. The withdrawal from GENUANG positions was a rather ticklish affair. The
Japs were pressing their attacks and there was little opportunity of making a
clean break However, taking advantage during slight lulls in the action, one Tp
was withdrawn at a time. A Tp remained to the last and continued firing right
up to the moment when the tractors were brought up and the gun trails hooked
on. A certain amount of infiltration by the Japs had occurred during the
last two days and all gun positions had reported intermittent sniping from the
jungle edges and thick rubber adjoining the flanks of positions. This became
such a nuisance that 27 Bde were requested to provide special flank protection
for gun positions. The Tps also organised patrols of spare personnel to deal
with this phase. Fifth Column elements amongst the local natives could possibly
have been one of the causes of this sniping. The Malay had already shown a
decided readiness to side with the Japs on more than one occasion. Soon after midnight, the last of the infantry broke off their contact
with the Japs and A Tp ceased firing and withdrew from their position. Regtl
rendezvous had been given as the SOCFIN Palm Oil Estate at LABIS which was reached without incident by
all Regtl vehicle groups by 0200 hours. After a wait of about an hour further
orders to move were received from RAA and guides met Tp Leaders at the YONG
PENG Crossroads and guided them into positions which had been reconnoitred in
the darkness. B Ech vehicles were detached here and sent on down the main road
to make camp at TAMPOY near JOHORE BAHRU During daylight hours on Jan 21,
1942 there was a full in operations so far as 2/15th gunners were
concerned. English and Indian troops of the 9 and 11 Indian Division were in
the picture again and their Fd Regts had come into action to relieve the
pressure on the AIF. This was the first breathing spell for, 2/15th personnel
since action commenced at GEMENCHEH Bridge 7 days earlier. The opportunity was
taken for repairs, and maintenance of equipment and vehicles, and for
personnel, shaving, washing and cleaning up generally. For many weary bodies
this was also the opportunity for some much needed sleep. Jap Air activity was very brisk during the day and the YONG PENG
Crossroads and AA guns positions in their vicinity received heavy bombings, but
the Regtl Groups well concealed in their various positions deep in the rubber were
not bothered this day by Air attacks. Jan 22, 1942. After dark last night, 29 Bty was moved to harbourage at MENGKIBOL
Estate. The British Fd Regts still carried on the Arty support and the
breathing spell continued for 2/15 Fd Regt The menacing advance of the Japanese
forces in the MUAR area was still a disquieting factor in the situation and the
AIF positions were still in danger and liable to be cut off until the AYER
HITAM Crossroads were reached and passed in the withdrawal Southwards. About this time we learnt that British RAF Hurricane Fighters had
reached SINGAPORE in an aircraft carrier and we were promised adequate air
support in a few days. The promise of this air support was encouraging. The
succession of withdrawals actions was becoming rather depressing, and the Jap
Air Force, as far as we could see, had no aerial opposition to contend with.
Like many promises made in the Malayan campaign, this one was incapable of
fulfilment because events moved too quickly, but we certainly saw some Hurricane
Fighters when we reached SINGAPORE Island, but the few that were serviceable
and able to take the air were moved a few days later to SUMATRA and JAVA
because their aerodromes were within Jap Arty range. In the early hours of the night Jan 22/23 RHQ moved with 27 Bde
HQ to vicinity of 49 3/4mile peg on main road. 29 and 30 Btys also moved to new
positions South of AYER HITAM Crossroads. Here, one of the rare opportunities
occurred in this campaign amid jungle and rubber trees to man an OP with some reasonable
degree of observation according to field gunner standards. 30 Bty was able to
occupy an OP on a hill North of AYER HITAM Crossroads and made good use of this
opportunity to direct fire on to the advancing Jap troops. 29 Bty, moving forward to new positions to improve range, carried out
predicted shooting in support of 26 Bn (AIF) positions along BATU PAHAT Road.
Jap Air activity still on the increase and there was immediate bombing of any
MT seen moving on the roads. These forward infantry positions were also
constantly being dive‑bombed. During the afternoon of Jan 23 straggling
parties of mixed AIF from the MUAR Force commenced to reach YONG PENG and AYER
HITAM, and included some of the survivors of 65 Bty. Most of these men were in
a serious state of exhaustion and in need of medical attention. They had made
their way through Jungle and swam rivers, evading the Japs searching for them
after the remnants of the Force were overrun at PARIT SULONG Bridge a few days
earlier. We heard firsthand accounts of their gruelling experiences and learnt
that the OC of 65 Bty, Maj W.W. Julius, had been severely wounded in a bombing
attack of 44 Indian Bde HQ which practically wiped out all Bde HQ personnel
except Brig Duncan. This gallant Brigadier was killed the next day when leading
a bayonet charge. Those of the survivors who saw Maj Julius said he could not
possibly have lived long as his wounds were so serious. Jan. 24, 1942. Both Btys heavily engaged during the night. 30 Bty moving forward
slightly to improve range just before dawn. 29 Bty had the satisfaction of
destroying by observed fire several Jap mortar crews. The tenacity, stubborness and bravery of the Japs was quite
extraordinary. In this incident, after a mortar and crew had been destroyed by
a 25pdr HE shell, a second and third crew with mortars just calmly walked to
the same position, set up their mortars only to receive a few seconds later
another 25pdr HE shell in their midst. Dive bombers at this stage were hovering over gun positions most of the
daylight hours. C Tp positions caught several sticks of bombs, losing several
vehicles, but fortunately no personnel, the latter by now appreciating the
value of handy slit trenches. 29 Bty moved back during the night
of Jan 24/25 to new positions in vicinity of SIMPANG RENGAM. RHQ followed shortly afterwards with 27 Bde HQ and set up near the 29
mile peg on main road. Both Btys throughout Jan 25 on harassing fire tasks in support of 27
Bde. Today saw the arrival from SINGAPORE of the 2 Bn of the Gordon Highlanders,
who came up to reinforcethe AIF coming under command of 27 Bde AIF (Brig
Maxwell). The Gordons had just completed 3 years garrison duty on SINGAPORE
Island, and within an hour of arrival at the front were taken into action on a
counter attack support by the Regt with B and C Tps to relieve the pressure on
the AIF front Later that day C Tp retired to a new position in vicinity of 50
mile peg making a risky move by daylight under cover of a heavy rain storm
without attracting air attention from the Jap dive bombers. 27 Bde HQ and 2/15
RHQ were not so lucky in this regard. Earlier, in the afternoon they were
bombed twice, forcing a quick move with vehicles widely dispersed to a new
position some miles to the rear. The Regt suffered some casualties to personnel
and vehicles in these two raids, 84 LAD being the chief sufferer. At dusk 30
Bty also moved back occupying a new position near SIMPANG RENGAM. Across on the AIF right 22 Indian Bde was putting up stiff resistance in
the KLUANG area. The 5/6 SIKHS staged a brilliant counter attack and recovered
KLUANG Aerodrome, only to be driven out the next day by overwhelming numbers. The CO during the day while on a visit to forward positions with his driver,
Gnr D.E. Killen, were witnesses of a deliberate attack by two Jap Dive Bombers
on a British convoy of Ambulances filled with wounded. The two bombers flew
over the convoy at about 400 feet then turned and attacked from the front
dropping about 4 bombs each, destroying several of the ambulances. Jan. 26, 1942. 29 Bty in action today, supporting 26 Bn AIF Gun positions, CP and W/L
heavily attacked by dive bombers. Capt R.P.A. Rabett wounded by bomb splinter
and some damage to vehicles in the W/L. After dark, 30 Bty moved to new
positions in the vicinity of 40/41 mile pegs and covering SIMPANG RENGAM. In
these positions, it was impossible to site the guns away from the main road
which ran here through densely thick jungle, much of it rising straight out of
swamp. The guns had to be echeloned along the side of ' the main road and
traffic control instituted in order to hold up passing vehicles while the guns
were firing. Gun zones were somewhat limited under these conditions and OP's,
of course, were out of the question. Jan. 27, 1942. Jap Air Force active all day and any movement at all on the roads
extremely hazardous. 29 Bty and D Tp on counter fire (CF) targets and fleeting
opportunities. FOO's and LO's with forward infantry elements made many calls for
fire. During the day, the Jap bombers managed to find 30 Bty CP and C Tp W/L.
Several vehicles damaged and some casualties, including Lt Harry Hingst killed.
C Tp was compelled to make a quick move to another position to avoid further
unwelcome attention. New position near 361/4 mile peg. In the early dusk D Tp moved back and off the main
road about 800 yards in from the 35 mile peg. RHQ with 27 Bde HQ also moved in early dusk to position near 26 mile
peg, and about 250 yards deep in the rubber. Jap bombers must have been given
some word of this move as they constantly searched the area from as low as 100
feet but the rubber trees were thick and leafy and no bombs were dropped near
the positions. While here, orders were received to send a reconnaissance party to
survey an alternative route for the final withdrawal back to SINGAPORE Island.
It was feared that the one main road would become so congested with troops and
vehicles that the Jap bombers would be able to take a heavy toll. Jan 28, 1942. Before first light 29 Bty withdrew from yesterday's position to a
harbourage near 32 mile peg, later in the day occupying a position near 26 mile
peg. 30 Bty in early dusk moved into a new position between 29 and 30 mile
pegs. Both Btys in action throughout day with FOO up with the infantry. Lt R.J. Keating wounded today by bomb splinters whilst acting as LO
between RAA and Regt Jan 29, 1942. 29 Bty in action throughout day with FOO observation. One shoot reported
as having broken up a Bde attack on the 26 Bn front. Some trouble today with
damp charges, necessitating an addition of about 500 yards to most ranges. 30 Bty in harbourage today near KOLA]. C Tp guns (18 pdr) out of action
due to mechanical faults. 29 Bty at 2200 hours retired to position near 21 mile peg. Orders received this night to evacuate 2 Tps and all other vehicles that
could be spared to SINGAPORE Island. As C Tp was out of action, it was decided to send back A and C Tps under
the command of Maj K. Moulton, leaving B and D in action under Maj A.F. Ball. B
and D Tps took up new positions near 17 3/4mile peg and commenced to fire a
heavy fire plan to cover the withdrawal of evacuating elements. All Regtl vehicles other than gun trailers, several Sig Sect trucks,
some DR's and the CO's car, were sent back with the Tps being withdrawn. RHQ moved in early dusk to vicinity of 14 mile peg in conformity with
move by 27 Bde Ha Faulty map reading was responsible today for the Regt losing a Sig truck
and 3 men. It was driving up to forward troops with a FOO and suddenly found
itself amongst Jap soldiers. Jan 30, 1942. B and D Tps heavily engaged all day in harassing fire tasks. More trouble
with faulty charges causing some prematures, one almost a muzzle burst
resulting in one casualty in the gun crew. There was a story going the rounds
that one of the English WO's had
recognized some of the charges now being delivered to the Regt as having
been salvaged from the DUNKIRK evacuation. It was said that he recognized the
lots and markings of ammunition he had helped to salvage at DUNKIRK in 1940‑‑ During the day infiltration parties of Japs cut the Regtl communications
and one gun position was in danger of being overrun for a while. But prompt
action by 30 Bn AIF restored the situation, and thereafter more attention was
given to protecting the flanks of gun positions. B Tp ceased firing at 2030 hours and commenced withdrawal to SINGAPORE
Island by the alternative route surveyed two days earlier. D Tp continued in
action until 2230 hours firing a heavy program designed to cover the withdrawal
of 30 Bn. About midnight Maj A.F. Ball reported that all Regtl guns and
vehicles were accounted for and were on the move towards the CAUSEWAY. Adv RHQ then obtained permission from Brig Maxwell to withdraw to the
Island by the alternative route which was to leave main road at SENAT, strike
East through Estate roads past the Rubber Factory, through dirt tracks in large
Pineapple growing areas, to strike the KOTA TINGG Road about 10 miles from the
CAUSEWAY thence along it through JOHORE BAHRU and on to the Island. The move was accomplished by all Regtl Grps without incident Luck was with us in more ways than one. It was a clear moonlight night Had the Jap Air Force been more venturesome in regard to night flying operations they could have inflicted enormous damage on the withdrawing columns. The one main road and the very third class alternative route were jammed with vehicles and equipment stacked up almost radiator to tailboard for miles. Th |